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TT7HEN
• *

we

turn from the part individual

played in ethical theory and consider

once appears of so simple a nature that

it

responsibility

in

and of

has

itself, it at

absence from the world-

its

How does it happen
had not even a rough conception of individual accountand that they failed to distinguish between designed and ac-

view of early men becomes

in itself a

problem.

that they
ability

cidental acts

^^'estermarck points out that lower animals quite

?

naturally retaliate on the agent of an

ill turn, and he gives copious
must have been the force of some potent conception that prevented the issue of this simple notion among early men.
'Tt needs little reflection and a very moderate amount of selfknowledge"", says Hobhouse,^ "to distinguish between design and
accident and a very moderate amount of reasoning power to apply
the same to other men.
lUit the nascent reflection of savage men
was strangled at birth by the prevailing theorv of witch-craft and
possession". Well, at least, by some attitude or conception of more
profound force than the sense of individual agency.

illustration.'

This fact

It

will

be

made

to stand out in relief

by a glance

at the

issue of the notion of individual responsibility in relation to the

concept of moral evil

among

the Greeks.

It

had different issues

philosophy and in drama, so that a comparison

With

the former

— the

sine

it

qua non.

became
It

was incompatible with
''Origin

^Morals

in

illuminating.

in Aristotle the basic principle of ethics

excluded from the
In the latter

itself.

and Dcvcloptncnt of Moral Ideas, Vol.
in Evolution, Vol.

is

I,

p.

93.

field of ethics
it

I, p.

whatever

plays a subordinate
36

f.
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a force, deeper and of wider scope,

of old /a/^, incompatible with individual responsibility,

which nevertheless cannot be excluded from one field with it.
Surely it was no great achievement for such a mind as Aristotle
to bring to

What

complete clearness the notion of individual responsibility.

But in
it, abstractly considered, is not hard to get at.
making this analysis, Aristotle was resisting a powerful force in
Greek tradition. Plato had gone part way. Positing individual responsibility as the ground necessitating ethics, he had attributed the
power of choice to the individual. But he continued to hold with
He was held in
Socrates that a luan who did evil was not free.
bonds. Here is the inward coercion which Aristotle found limiting
the will. He excluded it from ethics because it came from beyond
what the individual agent could not
the individual's volition
avoid did not belong to the field of ethics.^ But Plato will not so
Instead he attempts to rationalize it.^'' That
easily exclude it.
"blindness of passion", which the Greeks among all other peoples
attributed to the gods, was not easily to be excluded from the realm
lies in

:

of ethics.

had one undivided basis

It

The weight

in reality

with

human

volition.

of this realm of psychical coercion, of '^non-volitional

conation", which

is

the life -centre of religion in primitive times and

in all times, held strongly against a clear realization of individual

responsibility

Greek

among

all

early men.

It is

powerfully evident

in all

ethical thinking.

The

ethical thought of both the philosophers

and dramatists of

Greece is passionate and strained. In all the history of human thinkIn the
ing there is perhaps no equal instance of baffled eagerness.
gnomic thinkers the Greek intelligence was tearing itself away from
A sensitive moral consciousness attempted to
religious tradition.
rqDudiate gods that were evil as well as good and to find a clear
But they could achieve no immediate insight
basis for reality.

upon which they could proceed without emotion.

The simple

notion

of individual responsibility did not issue to clarify their thinking.

Profound feeling
like the
is

due

is

reflected in the

fragments of early philosophy

passion Euripides manifests in his treatment of deity.

to the baffled sense that both evil

and good have

It

their basis

of reality beyond the volition and also the insight of the individual.
^K'ichoinachean Ethics,

Book

III,

Chap. V,

loWindelband, History of Philosophy,

tr.

2, 4.

Jas.

H. Tufts,

p.

191

f.
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In the primitive world-view which was their starting-point they

found individuals and peoples submerged

in a

cosmic

evil,

an "un-

cleanness' of shed blood and of passionate strife which issued

the unseen world of gods and fates.
escapelessly in fated courses.

The

Guilt might

individual

fall

upon

a

from
was merged
man by acci-

might centre upon a stick or a falling
stone, and these must be solemnly tried and if found guilty, carried
beyond the borders. Philosophers and dramatists as well as common men found a reality in these traditional attitudes not easily to
dent and infect a

be shaken

Why

off.

minds of

classical

fixed itself

It

city.

that this does not appear to the foremost

is it

Greece to be a

silly

superstition of savages?

upon courts of law down even

to

modern

times.

It

The

some
Pericles and Protagoras debated through a
ground in reality.
whole day as to whether, in a certain accident, a man or a spear was
fact gives evidence that this

early attitude of thought has

Plato's Lazvs provide for the

the bearer of the guilt of bloodshed.^^

of animals and inanimate things and for their death or banish-

trial

ment

if

found

guilty.^-

conceptions of early

It

men

become

the main

difficult to believe that

arose from no real basis in

human

nature

but were superstitions, entirely adventitious, which prevented the

human

arrival of

intelligence at the simple notion of individual re-

sponsibility.

Early Greek science remained farther afield in the traditional

who

world-view than did the dramatists,

The

indeed were of a later day.

early scientists interpreted polarity in nature

opposites"

They

—

cases

as

of

evil

— of

the

—the

"strife of

"uncleanness" of tradition.

without figure, as a vendetta in nature, quite as
the Dionysian ritual treated the opposition between the gods of
the old and of the new year. A fragment from Anaxamander says,
treated

it,

"All things suffer retribution for their injustice to each other ac-

Heraclitus views this strife of

cording to the ordinance of time".

opposites as the basis of the natural world.
earliest

human

thought, moral evil

scope, a cosmic principle.

is

made

Quite in the
a

spirit of

force of universal

Only, reduced thus to a universal scien-

moral aspect becomes thin, and disappears. The predominant notion of tradition, namely, the superindividual, superparticular aspect of evil, was dominant also in the minds of these
tific

law,

its

i^Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol.
12873 f.
See Westermarck, Op.
of the force of this idea

down

to

p.

446.

Cit.,

Vol.

I,

modern

I,

times.

Chap. X, for a

full

account
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thinkers.

But

moved

they

in reducing' a

off the basis

moral attitude to a

of tradition

He

Socrates took another course.
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scientific principle,

"Enlio;htcnment".

into the

separated the natural

clearly

and ethical realms. But, true to the spirit of the "Enlightenment",
he conceived the good as a noetic form which the individual could
grasp and so achieve. He thus paved the way by which Aristotle
escaped from Greek tradition and reduced ethics to the realm of
individual volition. The social atomism in Aristotle's definition of
moral good and evil as precisely what the individual has power to
do or to avoid was a logical issue of the Greek Enlightenment.
But the dramatists present a separate development of ethical
ideas in which they do not move off the basis of tradition into the
abstract.
They are concerned with the problem of "fate" the

—

problem, that

They

of the imposition of evil upon the individual.

is,

stand squarely with primitive traditions in general in attaching a

moral opprobrium

—an

intense sense of

even under his superimposed

guilt

However

evil.

—

to

the individual,

the aspects of evil

which occupy the centre of the stage in Greek drama are always
such acts as common sense in our own day would call moral evil.
To be sure all traditions, such as the uncleanness of non-moral
breaches of taboo, are reflected in the plays but they never claim
the centre of interest.

Sophocles,

it

is

Oedipus,

true, presents

has fallen by an accident into patricide and incest, as

wholly polluted and
tradition.

He

is

full of guilt.

Tra?

who

avayvo?,

But Sophocles stands nearest

to

interested in painting nobility of character in the

face of traditional "sin".

Aeschylus and Euripides however have

humanized the content of tradition and correctly delimited
The Center of their stage is always occupied by
moral evils in which individuals are involved, not accidentally but
by their own volition. But the evils are fated evils, larger than
entirely

the field of ethics.

themselves.

In the

Agamemnon

of Aeschvlus. the "fury of the

house of Atridae" involves Clytemnestra in the slaying of
non.

In the sequel

The

volition of each

evils

it

is

involves

Orestes

escapelessly

drawn

in

Agamem-

the mother

murder.

into a concatenation of

forming a compact social unity in which every link is a necesat the same time it involves the volition of an individual.

though

sity

Euripides presents similar situations, only with broad political meanings

suggested.

place^^ that the

The

present writer has pointed out in another

view of moral

evil

here presented

^'lutcrnational Journal of Ethics, Vol. 55, No.

1,

is

the

Oct. 1924.

same view
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which, with or without attempted explanation, has been held by

Hebrew and

many

Christian tradition, by

ferent religious and secular circles,

great minds in widely dif-

— Hebrew prophets,

Greek dra-

modern satirists, poets, and novelists, by one philosopher,
Immanuel Kant, and by occidental common sense entire. This view

matists,

differs from primitive man's conception only in that natural evil
and accident are excluded. The essential characteristic of the primitive attitude is maintained
the superindividual qualitv of moral
evil.
The concept, as social atomism will view it at least, continues to carry a contradiction at its heart.
It is larger than any
individual and involves all individuals somewhere and sometime in

—

its

stream.

Lord

It

man

escapeless, yet every

is

—

in the hearts of all the people

the spirit of a

new and

is

responsible for his

is

Just as the inwardness of moral good

deeds.

—the

Word

of the

conceived by Jeremiah as

lasting Israel, a religious

and

social force

focussed inwardly in each individual, so also the motive of

taken up and willed by the individual

is

evil,

yet involved in a social set-

which renders it inevitable. In this view of moral evil
which has persisted through all ages of history, what is essential to
The inthe view of primitive man is unchangeably maintained.

ting of evil

is still the locus of moral evil focussing from beyond him.
Only now the line separating the moral from the physical universe
is clearly drawn and the locus of moral evil is identified with the
moral agent. The notion of individual responsibility has emerged

dividual

which long blocked

at the heart of a larger conception

and with which

it

maintained even

in contradiction

appears to be wholly incompatible.

egress

its

But

it

is

by a vigorous though baffled re-

action to things as they are.

What

prevented

this

of early men, though
animals,

may

it

simple notion from issuing in the thought
plainly evident in the behavior of lower

is

be clearly outlined.

responsibility at

all

unless

it

gets

It
its

philosophers have never been able to

is

no
But

clear tbat there can be

locus in the individual.

draw

a distinct line except in

the abstract between the accountability of the individual and the

force arising out of the social miliou and impelling the individual.

Left in the abstract, Aristotle's analysis
individual responsibility.

The

is

clear

and

clearly defines

responsibility of the agent

is

limited

by ignorance of the matter, by physical compulsion and by psychical
coersion." But when he comes to cases, Aristotle is well aware that
"O/). at.,

Book

III,

Chap.

I,

esp. 10

and

11.
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no

distinct

marks

line

off the

agent's responsibility.

can be drawn between what was due to his

own
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No

distinct

and
what was due to psychical coercion out; of his social milieu. It
becomes evident that these two form an intrinsic unity not to be divided except by violence. The immediate agent must then be conline

ceived as the locus of a responsibility that
volition.

Their combined responsibility
sential unity.
cial milieu.

vidual

It

wider than his own

is

other secondary loci in less immediate agents.

finds

It

volition

is

manifest as merged into an es-

extends to the limits of the immediate agent's so-

unites in an intrinsic whole incalculably

It

What

responsibilities.

many

indi-

can be imputed to the immediate

agent can only be roughly assessed for purposes of judicial usage of
him.
Since this

is

so

taken as such and by
is

becomes

it

fundamental to ethics

is

other than but inclusive

taken at

Among

its full

clear that individual responsibility,

not the test of ethical situations.

itself, is

What

a conception of responsibility which

of

individual

This

responsibility.

is

fact

value would have wide bearing upon ethical theory.

other things

it

would

vitiate the usual

ing moral origins and development.

Might

method of

it

investigat-

not be that the full

quality and passion of an ethical situation might attach to the sense

of group responsibility, while yet the part of the immediate agent

among

the other parts of this intrinsic whole

was

felt

only in the

vaguest way?
It

may

be stated with some degree of confidence then, that the

process of moral advance has not been one of adding moral elements
to a primitively non-moral world-view.

It has been that, rather, of
non-moral elements through an analysis brought by
experience to the content of religion. This fact may be best illustrated by a brief outline of this process of moral advance as it ac-

eliminating

tually occurred in

Hebrew

history.

Here, by a remarkable social

experience, incompatible and adventitious elements were eliminated

and an adequate conception of the suniuuun honnm was achieved.

The

iniah clohini

is

the primitive theoplasm, the source of

power, both of good and of
tred in Jahweh.

Moses who

evil.^''

is

W\t\\ certain tribes

it

the founder of Jahwism, experienced

a profound social passion for his people enslaved in Egypt.
attributed this social passion to Jahweh.

Key

all

w^as cen-

He

i^Kautsch. Hasting's Bible Dictionary, Vol. V,
to Faith, tr. Herman Frank, p. 124 f.

p.

He

conceived himself as
667a.

Gershenson, The
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God not as a conqueror but as the Hberator of a slave
considered social justice to be the outstanding character-

the vicegerent of

He

people.

The ruah Jahzveh became

of his god, Jahweh.

istic

longer of both good and

evil,

the source, no
There gradually

but of good alone.

developed in the prophetic succession a clear insight into the incompatibility of magic practices with the social justice that character-

Jahweh.

ized

When

the nation relied upon ritual rather than upon

was denounced by the prophets. The end
view was a society based in righteousness the people of Jahweh.
Jeremiah finally saw that the national responsibility could not be
righteousness, ritual also

—

in

mediated through kings and

priests.

failure by the events leading

up

social responsibility
in the

He

and the authority of Jahweh

conceived of the

as being localized

The law

inward nature of the individual people themselves.

God was

of

That method was proved a

to the exile.

written in the hearts of the people.

ception of the supreme good, thus

manity-wide.

made inward,

In the Deutero-Isaiah,

harmonious

to be brought into a

Moreover the con-

all

is

also

made hu-

the nations of the world are

society.

The ruah

clohhn, the

primitive theoplasm, has been cleansed of adventitious elements and

has become at once inward and universal through the discovery by

Moses of its profoundly social nature.
That this social nature was, from the
if

vaguely

felt to lie in

suggested in several primitive notions.

and

especially the

the

religious

human being

dread

of

early

fit

powerfully

mana is
The human being

in need,

races.

strongly
as such,

has a special power over

Though warriors

rightly

though any "outlandish" person was
object for hate and slaughter; yet the shed

slaughtered their tribal foes
often, as such, a

earliest times,

the primitive theoplasm or

blood, even of an enemy,

;

was an uncleanness

that required in

some

months of cleansing ritual. Again, the greatest sin of early
times was the neglect of the guest. The stranger, as though merely
by virtue of his humanity, had a powerful claim upon primitive men.
That this claim had its sanction in superstition, and that when it was
fulfilled, the host might follow and rob his former guest, does not
cases

lessen but rather deepens the significance of the fact

;

since thus

would have submerged hospitality, if it
mere accident and not in human nature itself.

forces are presented which

had had

its

basis in

Besides these facts there
the poor

and needy.

is

the superior potency of the curses of

The fundamentally

social nature of the original
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theoplasm of primitive conception
in the

Kingdom

conception of the

dition,

it

may

is
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thus strongly suggested

be said that

God

and,

;

from Hehrew trathe primitive world-view had only atof

issuing

tained clearness and eliminated extraneous matters in the course of
its

development from pre-J\Iosiac religion

to the religion of Jesus.

We

that the

affirm then with

man was

some confidence

group conscious-

moral consciousness and his sense
of group responsibility had genuine moral force.
The truly enlightened moral consciousness will not find the concept of individual
ness of early

a genuine

nub of

responsibility to be the

The ground

ethics.

of ethics lies

rather in a passion that reprobates moral evil and delights in moral

good without any immediate reference
for instance, that the Great

War

to individuals.

It

affirms,

ought not to have been and there-

somehow might have been avoided by mankind, without

fore

plac-

ing passionate measures of responsibility on individuals and special

groups.

As we have

roughly to assess individual responsibility

said,

But responsibility finds its comforward looking aspect, where some large

in things past, has its judicial use.

meaning only

plete

in its

purpose renders each individual a locus of a common responsibility, each locus dififering from others according to the differing

social

powers and opportunities of individuals.
is

Individual responsibility

an organic element in social responsibility.

We

can merely suggest in conclusion what can be developed

—

that this view of the imposition of good and
upon the individual and, at the same time, his personal involvement in the one and responsibility for the other can be explained only by taking at its face value the saying of Aristotle that

only in another place
evil

man

is

a political,

i.

e.,

conclusion and making

and

ethics.

the

The hypothesis

matter will not

fit

by following it to its logical
working hypothesis of both psychology

a social animal,
it

the case,

that sociality
if

the

is

common

in its essence

an acquired

sense view of moral

supported by the weight of great but non-metaphysical minds
to be explained

away; and

especially

suggested to the primitive tradition.

if

it

We

bear the relation

is

all

not

we have

are compelled to conceive

of man, not, indeed, as "having a social instinct", but rather,
suggest, as having

evil,

we

the original impulses of his nature centered

about a gregarious drive in an innate system whose connections

may

be weaker or stronger in

or strengthened by education

dififerent

in

individuals

different

social

and weakened
Those

circles.
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who

find real force in the present tendency to

at least all

will

may

all

innate drives,

be reminded that a gregarious drive

have the general nature of the species

member

view

innate drives, as general without anything speci-

in their object-quest,

fic

to

human

in question.

Only, any

of this species to which the organism itself belongs serves

awaken the gregarious drive

into operation, or

any species

cry,

or other sign, whose mechanism will be innately connected with the
neural basis of the drive.

That the

instincts are,

from the dawn of human existence, an

innate system, calling for an integrated humanity for
faction, suggests that reason

may be

its final satis-

conceived, not as an "instru-

open system of

ment of the

instincts", but as itself knit into this

drives as

object-finding or perceptual end, perceiving not only

its

objects but also objective relations, which are taken

perceived to parallel relations subjectively

system of impulses and emotions.

realized

up
in

as they are

the

innate

